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Abstract
In this contribution we analyze a parties’ vote share distribution across the polling stations during the
Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 1992, 2008 and 2012. We find that the distribution is rather well
fitted by the Beta distribution. To reproduce this empirical observation we propose a simple multi-state
agent-based model of the voting behavior. In the proposed model agents change the party they vote for
either idiosyncratically or due to a linear recruitment mechanism. We use the model to reproduce the vote
share distribution observed during the election of 1992. We discuss model extensions needed to reproduce
the vote share distribution observed during the other elections.
1 Introduction
While any individual vote is equally important to determine the outcome of an election, the probability for a
single vote to decide the outcome is extremely small. As utility of casting a vote in this context seems to be
small and as there is at least a minor associated cost, it seems that a rational choice would be simply not to vote.
Yet this simplistic context may be further extended to provide a sound reasoning for why people vote. Some
argue that people vote to show a support for the political system [1] or to avoid a risk of regret [2], there might
also be a social cost for abstension [3]. Some of the aforementioned works as well as numerous other earlier game
theoretic approaches, such as [4–6], had shown promise that game theoretic voting models would soon provide
rich and sophisticated explanation for the voting behavior. Yet further research have shown that general game
theoretic models of the voting behavior with pure Nash equilibrium, and even mixed Nash equilibrium, might
be impossible unless under certain specific conditions [7–9]. But people are rarely well informed and ideally
rational, as they are not homo economicus nor are they Laplace’s demons, [10–12].
The above context provides a good reasoning to consider the modeling of the voting behavior from the perspective
of psychology [13–20]. The main drawback of these psychologically motivated models is that they usually are
rather complicated, at least when compared with game theoretic models, hard to implement and understand the
obtained results. Also usually these models involve a large number of parameters, which may lead to overfitting
the data or different parameter sets providing similar results. Notably recently a psychologically motivated
model was successfully used to predict the Polish election of 2015 [17, 19].
Another possible approach to the modeling of the voting behavior has its roots in statistical physics. This
perspective could be neatly summarized by quoting the Boltzmann’s molecular chaos hypothesis [21]:
The molecules are like so many individuals, having the most various states of motion, and the
properties of gases only remain unaltered because the number of these molecules which on the
average have a given state of motion is constant.
During the last three decades physicists have approached social and economic systems from this perspective,
looking for universal laws and important statistical patterns, while proposing simple theoretical models to
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explain the empirical observations. This effort by a numerous more or less prominent physicists became what
is now known as sociophysics and econophysics [22–27]. The opinion dynamics, and the voting behavior as a
proxy of opinion, is still one of the major topics in sociophysics [25–30].
This paper contributes to the understanding and describtion of the voting behavior from a couple of differ-
ent point of views. First of all Lithuania is a young democratic nation and the analysis of the Lithuanian
parliamentary elections’ data sets seems interesting in the context of similar analyses carried out on the data
sets gathered in the mature democratic nations, such as Brazil, England, Germany, France, Finland, Norway
or Switzerland [31–35]. In the political science and sociological literature one would find numerous previous
approaches to the Lithuanian parliamentary elections, e.g., [36–40]. Yet most of these approaches had a quite
different perspective, most of these papers discuss general electoral trends in the context of social, demographic
and economic changes. For this kind of discussion a highly aggregated (e.g., on a municipal district level) data
sets prove to be sufficient, while in this paper we will consider the data on the smallest scale available (polling
station level).
Another key contribution of this paper is a simple agent-based model, which is used to explain the statistical
patterns uncovered during the empirical analysis. The proposed model is built upon a two-state herding model
originally proposed by Kirman in [41]. In the recent years the two-state herding model was quite frequently and
rather successfully applied to reproduce the statistical patterns observed in the empirical data of the financial
markets [42–48]. In this paper we extend the two-state herding model to allow the agents to switch between more
than two states. We discuss the similarity between the proposed model and the well known Voter model [49–54].
Our approach is unique in a sense that we consider reproducing the parties’ vote share distribution observed
in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections. In the previous literature there was only a single attempt to model,
and predict, popular vote (aggregated vote share) in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections using regression
model, see [55]. Numerous previous sociophysics papers have mainly ignored the vote share distribution, likely
due to belief that the vote share distribution reflects electoral sensitivity to the policies promoted by the parties
and less to the endogenous interactions between the voters (a similar argument is given in [31]). To some extent
this belief is supported by game theoretic models, see [5,6]. Notably there were a couple of sociophysics papers
considering two-state agent-based models of the voting behavior, e.g., voting for or against certain proposals
in a referendum [29]. It is interesting to note that recently the binary models considered in [29] were used to
construct a simple financial market model [56], while we start from the financial market model [47] and move
towards the model of the voting behavior. While the vote share distribution was mainly ignored in the previous
sociophysics papers, the other statistical patterns arising during the many different elections were considered
for the empirical analysis and modeling: a branching process model was proposed to reproduce the individual
politician, nominated via open party list, vote share distribution [31], a network model was used to explain
how people decide whether to take part in the municipal elections [34], a diffusive model for the turn-out was
proposed in [33, 35]. One of a more similar approaches was taken by [57], in which a generative model was
proposed to reproduce the rank-size distribution of parties’ vote share. Another similar approach, taken by [54],
considered the vote share distribution observed in the elections of House of Representatives in Japan. Latter
approach [54] also used a mean-field Voter model to explain the empirical observations.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the Lithuanian parliamentary election system as
well as carry out the empirical analysis. Next, in Section 3, we briefly introduce the two-state herding model
and extend it to account for the multiple states. Afterwards, in Section 4, we apply the extended model to
reproduce the statistical patterns uncovered during the empirical analysis. Finally we end the paper with a
discussion (see Section 5).
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2 Empirical analysis of the data from the Lithuanian parliamentary
elections
Let us start by discussing the parliamentary voting system used in Lithuania. Lithuanian parliamentary elections
are held every 4 years. During every election all of the 141 parliamentary seats are distributed using two-tier
voting system. Namely, 71 seats in the parliament are taken by elected district representatives (there are 71
electoral districts in total), while the other 70 seats are distributed according to the popular vote among the
parties that received more than 5% of the popular vote. In other words, each individual voter is able to vote
for a single candidate to represent his electoral district (the two round voting system is used) and for an open
party list (listing up to 5 individuals from that list). Every electoral district has multiple polling stations (their
number varies over the years), which further subdivide the electoral districts. Every eligible voter is assigned
to a single polling station based on location of their residence. Each of the polling stations may have widely
different number of the assigned voters – some of the smallest polling stations have as few as 100 assigned voters,
while the largest have up to 7000 assigned voters.
In this paper we consider only votes cast for the open party lists in each of the local polling stations. We do
not analyze ranking of the individuals on the party lists (similar analysis was carried out in, e.g., [31]), voting
for the representative of electoral district (similar data was previously considered in, e.g., [54, 57]) nor turnout
rates (modeling and analysis of which was previously considered in, e.g., [33, 35]). We ignore votes cast in the
polling stations abroad or votes cast by post. In the analysis that follows we consider only parties that were
elected to the parliament (total vote share larger thant 5%), while all other less succesful parties were combined
into a single party, which we have labeled as the “Other” party.
In this paper we consider the three data sets from the Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 1992, 2008 and
2012. All of the original data sets were made publicly available by the Central Electoral Commission of the
Republic of Lithuania (at https://www.rinkejopuslapis.lt/ataskaitu-formavimas). We have downloaded
the original data sets from the website on August 31, 2016. During the preliminary phase of the empirical
analysis we have found some small inconsistencies within the original data. The original 1992 election data set
had seven polling stations with incorrect total vote counts. We have identified three pairs of polling stations
which were, most likely, swapped among themselves as the number of missing votes in the one polling station
matched the number of surplus votes in the other. While we have dealt with the remaining polling station by
simply adjusting the total vote count to match the sum of votes cast for each of the parties in that polling
station. We have also found that data from 51 (out of 2034) polling stations is missing (the data was filled
with zeros) from the original 2008 election data set. We have not identified any issues with the original 2012
election data set. These minor inconsistencies would not impact the overall result of any of the considered
elections nor the results reported in this section. We have made the modified data sets available online at
https://github.com/akononovicius/lithuanian-parliamentary-election-data.
In the analysis that follows we consider the parties’ vote share distribution across each polling station. The vote
share, vij , is defined as total number votes cast for the party Vij divided by the total number of votes cast in
that polling station:
vij =
Vij∑K
k=1 Vkj
, (1)
here index i varies over the parties (K is the total number of parties participating in the election) and index
j varies over the polling stations. We consider the probability and rank-size distributions of vij across all of
the polling stations during the same parliamentary election. The probability distribution is estimated using
the standard probability density functions (abbr. PDF). The rank-size distributions are often used if the data
varies significantly in scale, e.g., word occurrence frequency [58], earthquake magnitudes [59], city sizes [60],
cross country income distributions [61]. When using this technique the original empirical data is sorted in
descending order. Afterwards the sorted data is plotted with the rank being the abscissa coordinate and the
actual value being the ordinate coordinate. In our case we sort the parties’ vote shares, vij , for each party i
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Figure 1: The vote share PDF of the most succesful parties during the 1992 election. The following parties were
considered: SK (a), LSDP (b), LKDP (c), LDDP (d) and O (e). The empirical values are shown as black circles,
while theoretical fits using the Beta distribution are shown as solid curves. The values of the Beta distribution
parameters are given in Table 1.
separately to produce v˜ik, for which
v˜i1 ≥ v˜i2 ≥ . . . ≥ v˜iM (2)
is true. In the above M is a total number of polling stations, so that index k represents correspond the rank.
Note that in this representation the same polling station may be ranked differently for diffferent parties (namely
k might be different for the same polling station for different i). Evidently these two approaches, PDFs and
rank-size distributions, are inter-related, but using both of them allows to uncover different statistical patterns.
2.1 The parliamentary election of 1992
The parliamentary election of 1992 was held in 2061 local polling stations. 17 parties competed in the par-
liamentary election, but only 4 of them were able to obtain more than 5% of popular vote. For the sake of
simplicity we will use the following abbreviations for these parties: SK – “Sąju¯dÂžio koalicija”, LSDP – “Lietu-
vos socialdemokratu˛ partija”, LKDP – “Lietuvos KrikÂščioniu˛ demokratu˛ partijos, Lietuvos politiniu˛ kaliniu˛ ir
tremtiniu˛ sąjungos ir Lietuvos demokratu˛ partijos jungtinis sąraÂšas”, LDDP – “Lietuvos demokratine˙ darbo
partija”. We have combined the other 13 parties to form the “Other” party (abbr. O) and considered the votes
cast for the combined “Other” party alongside the votes cast for the 4 main parties.
As you can see from Figs. 1 and 2 as well as Table 1 all of the parties with a notable exception of the “Other”
party are very well fitted by assuming that data is distributed according to the Beta distribution, PDF of which
is given by
p(vij) =
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α + β)
vα−1ij (1− vij)
β−1. (3)
The “Other” party stands out, because it includes “Lietuvos lenku˛ sąjunga” party (abbr. LLS; en. Association
of Poles in Lithuania). The LLS party had heavily relied on the support of the ethnic minorities, which were
spatially segregated. Namely, the representatives of ethnic minorities mostly live in larger cities and Vilnius
County. The observed spatial segregation could easily cause the segregation observed in the voting data.
In Fig. 3 we confirm this intuition by splitting the LLS party away from the “Other” party. After the split
the rank-size distribution of the “Other” party is well approximated by the Beta distribution with parameters
α = 4.9, β = 35.4 (R2RS = 0.992). To provide a good fit for the LLS rank-size distribution we assume that
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Figure 2: The rank-size distribution of the most succesful parties during the 1992 election. The following parties
were considered: SK (a), LSDP (b), LKDP (c), LDDP (d) and O (e). The empirical values are shown as black
circles, while theoretical fits using the Beta distribution are shown as solid curves. The values of the Beta
distribution parameters are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameters of the Beta distribution, α and β, used to fit the data in Figs. 1 and 2 as well as wellness
of fit for the PDFs, R2PDF , and the rank-size distributions, R
2
RS .
Party α β R2PDF R
2
RS
SK 3.9 16.6 0.956 0.994
LSDP 2.7 51 0.935 0.953
LKDP 2.2 16 0.926 0.995
LDDP 5.7 6.1 0.907 0.998
O 3 19.4 0.895 0.854
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Figure 3: The rank-size distributions of the LLS (a) party and the other parties in the O party (b). The empirical
values are shown as black circles, while solid curves provide fits by assuming that: vij ∼ 0.95 · Be(0.08, 10) +
0.05·Be(1.22, 1.37) (R2RS = 0.997; (a)), vij ∼ Be(4.9, 35.4) (R
2
RS = 0.992; (b)).
underlying data is distributed according to a mixture of the two Beta distributions: one (95% of points) with
parameters α1 = 0.08, β1 = 10 and the other (5% of points) with parameters α2 = 1.22, β2 = 1.37.
The parties’ vote share rank-size distributions were previously considered in [57]. Unlike in this paper, Fenner
and others assumed that the parties’ vote share is distributed according Weibull distribution, they have obtained
rather good fits for the UK election data. Yet fits obtained here, assuming Beta distribution, are also rather
good. We believe that Beta distribution is superior for this purpose from the theoretical point of view. Namely,
Beta distribution has reasonable support, probabilities are defined for v ∈ [0; 1], while Weibull distribution needs
to be arbitrary truncated, as probabilities are defined for v ∈ [0; +∞). Interestingly Fenner and others also
use a mixture distribution (of two Weibull distributions) to fit the UK election data. Similar observations were
also made when studying Brazilian presidential election data [62]. In [63] it was noted that multiple different
distributions, Weibull, log-normal and normal, provide good fits for the distribution of religions’ adherents. To
discriminate between the possibilities a deeper theoretical insight is needed.
2.2 The parliamentary election of 2008
The parliamentary election of 2008 was held in 2034 polling stations, yet we have only 1983 points in the
data set as the data from 51 polling stations is missing. In this election a slightly smaller number of parties
had participated (16), but now 7 of them were able to obtain more than 5% of popular vote. For the sake
of simplicity we will use the following abbreviations for them: LSDP – “Lietuvos socialdemokratu˛ partija”
(formed by LSDP and LDDP, which participated in the 1992 election), TS-LKD – “Te˙vyne˙s sąjunga – Lietuvos
krikÂščionys demokratai” (could be considered to be a successor of the SK and LKDP, which participated in the
1992 election), TPP – “Tautos prisike˙limo partija”, DP – “Koalicija Darbo partija + jaunimas”, LRLS – “Lietuvos
Respublikos liberalu˛ sąju¯dis”, TT – “Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas”, LiCS – “Liberalu˛ ir centro sąjunga”. As
previously all other parties (9 of them) were combined to form the “Other” party (abbr. O). We have considered
the votes cast for the combined “Other” party alongside the votes cast for the 7 main parties.
As is evident from Figs. 4 and 5 in the 2008 election the vote share distributions of the most of the parties
are well fitted by a mixture of two Beta distributions. Although now there is no clear-cut explanation for this
phenomenon, we would like to conjecture that this observation indicates that other spatial segregations (e.g., by
income) of voters in Lithuania have started to play an important role. Namely, most of the parties could now
be identified with specific socio-economic classes, e.g., some party starts favoring higher income voters (gaining
the support in cities), consequently losing the support of poorer voters (losing the support in rural areas).
2.3 The parliamentary election of 2012
The parliamentary election of 2012 was held in 2017 polling stations (thus we have 2017 data points). 18 parties
had participated in the election, while 7 of them were able to obtain more than 5% of popular vote. For the sake
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Figure 4: The vote share PDFs of the most succesful parties during the 2008 election. The following parties were
considered: LSDP (a), TS-LKD (b), TPP (c), DP (d), LRLS (e), TT (f), LiCS (g) and O (h). The empirical
values are shown as black circles, while theoretical fits using a mixture of Beta distributions are shown as solid
curves (the values of the parameters are given in Table 2).
Table 2: The parameters of a mixture of Beta distributions, here c is a weight of Be (α2, β2), used to fit the
data in Figs. 4 and 5 as well as wellness of fit for the PDFs, R2PDF , and the rank-size distributions, R
2
RS .
Party α1 β1 c α2 β2 R2PDF R
2
RS
LSDP 3.9 31.7 0.15 4.3 12.9 0.968 0.999
TS-LKD 3.7 16.8 0 – – 0.915 0.999
TPP 5.1 27.8 0 – – 0.884 0.992
DP 3 30.3 0.09 3.2 7.7 0.942 0.992
LRLS 2.7 67.9 0.54 0.6 12.6 0.986 0.994
TT 7.6 59.5 0.42 1.8 9.4 0.987 0.992
LiCS 0.98 23.5 0 – – 0.955 0.993
O 6.6 30.4 0.15 1.2 1.6 0.944 0.995
7
Figure 5: The rank-size distributions of the most succesful parties during the 2008 election. The following
parties were considered: LSDP (a), TS-LKD (b), TPP (c), DP (d), LRLS (e), TT (f), LiCS (g) and O (h).
The empirical values are shown as black circles, while theoretical fits using a mixture of Beta distributions are
shown as solid curves (the values of the parameters are given in Table 2).
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Figure 6: The vote share PDFs of the most succesful parties during the 2012 election. The following parties were
considered: LRLS (a), DP (b), TS-LKD (c), DK (d), LLRA (e), LSDP (f), TT (g) and O (h). The empirical
values are shown as black circles, while theoretical fits using a mixture of Beta distributions are shown as solid
curves (the values of parameters are given in Table 3).
of simplicity we will use the following abbreviations for them: LRLS – “Lietuvos Respublikos liberalu˛ sąju¯dis”,
DP – “Darbo partija”, TS-LKD – “Te˙vyne˙s sąjunga – Lietuvos krikÂščionys demokratai”, DK – “Drąsos kelias
politine˙ partija”, LLRA – “Lietuvos lenku˛ rinkimu˛ akcija”, LSDP – “Lietuvos socialdemokratu˛ partija”, TT –
“Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas”. Matching abbreviations indicate the same (or mostly the same) parties as in
2008 election. Once again the less-succesful parties were combined to form the “Other” party (abbr. O). The
votes cast for the combined “Other” party were analyzed alongside the votes cast for the 7 main parties.
Once again, as well as in the 2008 parliamentary election data set, it is evident that the vote share distributions
of the most of the parties in the 2012 parliamentary are also well described by a mixture of two Beta distributions
(see Figs. 6 and 7).
3 A multi-state agent-based model of the voting behavior
In this section we propose a simple multi-state agent-based model, which is to describes the voting behavior
within a small non-specific geographic region covered by a single polling station. Unlike in some previous
approaches [13–20], our aim is not to incorporate complex ideas from psychology, but to reproduce the empirical
parties’ vote share distribution. It is known that an agent-based herding model proposed by Alan Kirman, in [41],
reproduces Beta distribution. So let us start by introducing Kirman’s herding model.
Originally in [41] Kirman noted that biologists and economists observe similar behavioral patterns. Apparently
both ants and people show interest in things which are more popular among their peers regardless of their
objective properties [64–68]. In [41] a simple two-state model was proposed to explain these observations.
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Figure 7: The rank-size distributions of the most succesful parties during the 2012 election. The following
parties were considered: LRLS (a), DP (b), TS-LKD (c), DK (d), LLRA (e), LSDP (f), TT (g) and O (h).
The empirical values are shown as black circles, while theoretical fits using a mixture of Beta distributions are
shown as solid curves (the values of parameters are given in Table 3).
Table 3: The parameters of a mixture of Beta distributions, here c is a weight of Be (α2, β2), used to fit the
data in Figs. 6 and 7 as well as wellness of fit for the PDFs, R2PDF , and the rank-size distributions, R
2
RS .
Party α1 β1 c α2 β2 R2PDF R
2
RS
LRLS 1.5 22 0 – – 0.969 0.994
DP 4.5 14.5 0.03 15.3 11.1 0.973 0.999
TS-LKD 3.4 22 0 – – 0.938 0.982
DK 1.9 26 0 – – 0.946 0.994
LLRA 0.06 1.9 0.05 2.1 1.9 0.857 0.990
LSDP 5 21.4 0.05 5.5 6.6 0.948 0.997
TT 4.6 62 0.29 1.1 6.7 0.963 0.995
O 7 45.8 0.23 2 8 0.966 0.970
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In the contemporary interpretations of the Kirman’s model the following mathematical form of the one step
transition probabilities is used (see [42–45]):
P (X → X + 1) = (N −X) (σ1 + hX)∆t, (4)
P (X → X − 1) = X [σ2 + h (N −X)]∆t, (5)
here N is a total number of agents acting in the system, X is a total number of agents occupying the first
state (consequently there are N − X agents occupying the second state), σi are the perceived attractiveness
parameters (may differ for different states), h is a recruitment efficiency parameter and ∆t is a relatively short
time step.
Let us now show that the two state model produces Beta distribution. This can be done by using birth–death
process formalism, which is well described in [69]. The dynamics of x = X
N
(let N be large) can be alternatively
described by the following master equation:
∆ω(x, t)
∆t
= N2
{
(E− 1)[pi−(x)ω(x, t)] + (E−1 − 1)[pi+(x)ω(x, t)]
}
, (6)
here ω(x, t) is time–dependent distribution, pi±(x) are the transition rates per unit of time (defined as pi±(x) =
p(X→X±1)
N2h∆t ), E and E
−1 are the one step increment and decrement operators. Let us expand these operators in
Taylor series up to the second order term:
E[f(x)] = f(x+∆x) ≈ f(x) + ∆x
d
d x
f(x) +
∆x2
2
d2
dx2
f(x), (7)
E
−1[f(x)] = f(x−∆x) ≈ f(x)−∆x
d
d x
f(x) +
∆x2
2
d2
dx2
f(x), (8)
here ∆x = 1/N . Putting these Taylor expansions back into the master equation as well as taking small time
step limit, yields the following Fokker–Planck equation:
∂
∂t
ω(x, t) = −
∂
∂x
[A(x)ω(x, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[B(x)ω(x, t)], (9)
A(x) = N
[
pi+(x)− pi−(x)
]
= ε1 (1− x)− ε2x, (10)
B(x) = pi+(x) + pi−(x) = 2x(1− x) +O
(
N−1
)
, (11)
where εi = σi/h. Steady–state distribution of this Fokker–Planck equation can be obtained by solving:
A(x)ωst(x)−
1
2
∂
∂x
[B(x)ωst(x)] = 0. (12)
In general case the solution of this ordinary differential equation is given by:
ωst(x) =
C0
B(x)
exp
[
2
∫ x A(u)
B(u)
du
]
, (13)
where C0 is normalization constant. In our specific case we obtain a PDF for the Beta distribution, Be (ε1, ε2),
ωst(x) =
C0
2
xε1−1 (1− x)ε2−1 . (14)
As in the typical parliamentary election there are more than two competitors, we need to generalize the model
to incorporate more than two states. From the conservation of the total number of agents N , we have:
P (Xi → Xi ± 1) =
∑
j 6=i
P (Xi → Xi ± 1, Xj → Xj ∓ 1) . (15)
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Assuming that the right hand side probabilities have the same form as Eqs. (4) and (5), we obtain:
P (Xi → Xi + 1) =
∑
j 6=i
Xj (σji + hjiXi)∆t, (16)
P (Xi → Xi − 1) = Xi
∑
j 6=i
[σij + hijXj] ∆t, (17)
These one step transition probabilities for Xi depend not only on Xi (as in the two-state model), but also on
all the other Xj (here j 6= i). To circumvent this potentially cumbersome dependence one needs to assume that
σij = σj and hij = h (where j 6= i). The first assumption, σij = σj , means that the perceived attractiveness
of any party does not depend on who is attracted to it. While the second assumption, hij = h, means
that the recruitment mechanism is uniform (symmetric and independent of interacting agents). Note that
these assumptions contrast with the assumptions underlying the bounded confidence model [15, 16]. Yet these
assumptions are needed to ensure that xi = XiN is distributed according to the Beta distribution. After making
these assumptions we can further simplify the one step transition probabilities:
P (Xi → Xi + 1) = (N −Xi) (σi + hXi)∆t, (18)
P (Xi → Xi − 1) = Xi (σ−i + h [N −Xi])∆t, (19)
here σ−i =
∑
j 6=i σj is the total attractiveness of all of the competitors of the party i. By the analogy with the
two state model it should be evident that
xi ∼ Be (εi, ε−i) . (20)
Unlike the two-state model, it seems impossible to provide a useful general aggregated macroscopic description,
using the Fokker-Planck equation or a set of stochastic differential equations, of the generalizedM -state model.
In [70] a three-state model was considered and given an aggregated macroscopic description, by a system of two
stochastic differential equations, yet it was possible only under specific conditions.
The one step transition probabilities, while describe agent’s behavior, are still aggregate description of individual
agent level dynamics. So some discussion on what do the Eqs. (18) and (19) represent is relevant. Selecting one
random agent, per time step, and setting his switching probability to ε−i∆ts gives us idiosyncratic behavior term,
Xiε−i∆ts. While selecting another random agent and, if the both agents vote for the different parties, allowing
the first agent to copy the second agent’s voting preference gives us the recruitment term, Xi(N −Xi)∆ts. This
description of agent level dynamics could be further generalized to allow the model to be run on the randomly
generated networks [71, 72]. This agent-based algorithm might be seen to be a special case of the well known
Voter model [25, 49–51,53, 54].
4 The modeling of the parliamentary election
Now let us apply the proposed model to reproduce the empirical vote share PDFs and rank-size distributions,
which were observed during the 1992 parliamentary election. Here we consider only the simplest case by ignoring
the “Other” party and in this way removing distortions caused by the ethnic segregation (see the discussion in
Section 2.1). We do not consider the segregated data, the full data of the 1992 parliamentary election or the
data of the 2008 and 2012 parliamentary elections, as to account for the vote segregation a more sophisticated
approach is needed. Namely, in order to account for the full complexity of the empirical data additional
information, such as the spatial polling data or the socio-demographic data, would be needed. Although, in
general, one could try to infer the correct partition of the polling stations, where the vote share distribution of
each partion would be modelled using the proposed model using the same parameter set.
In Figs. 8 and 9 we compare the vote share PDFs and the rank-size distributions numerically generated by
the proposed model, Eqs. (18) and (19), and the respective empirical vote share distributions of the 1992
12
Figure 8: The vote share PDFs of the most succesful parties during the 1992 election fitted by the proposed
model. Only the following parties were considered: SK (a), LSDP (b), LKDP (c) and LDDP (d). The empirical
values are shown as black circles, while solid curves represent numerical results obtained from the proposed
model, driven by Eqs. (18) and (19) (the same model run as in Fig. 9). The parameters of the model are given
in Table 4.
Table 4: The parameters of the proposed model used to reproduce the vote share PDFs and the rank-size
distributions of the 1992 election as well as wellness of fit for the respective distributions.
Party εi R2PDF R
2
RS
SK 3.52 0.951 0.997
LSDP 1.13 0.705 0.881
LKDP 2.27 0.952 0.998
LDDP 8.87 0.904 0.973
parliamentary election. Yet we cannot use the previously empirically estimated Beta distribution parameters,
by assuming αi = εi and βi = ε−i, as model parameters, because an important model implication,
∑
l 6=i αl = βi,
doesn’t hold for the empirical data. Yet one may obtain the parameter values by fitting the empirical data with
the model implication in mind.
As you can see from Figs. 8 and 9 as well as Table 4 the proposed model excellently fits three of the four parties.
While for the LSDP the fit is not as good as one might expect. Note that model overestimates the success
of LSDP (the solid curve is above black circles for small k in subfigure (d)) and underestimates the electoral
support of LDDP (the solid curve is below black circles for small k in subfigure (h)). Thus it is likely that the
LSDP had small perceived chance to win the 1992 election (their aggregated vote share was near 5%), thus
voters who would actually consider voting for the LSDP cast their votes for the other left-wing party, which
had better perceived chance at winning the 1992 election (aggregated vote share of LDDP was above 40%).
We can check this intuition by violating the assumption that the perceived attractivenes should not depend
on the current state of the agent (agent’s currently supported party), namely instead of εi we now have εji.
Previously this assumption was needed to ensure that vote share is distributed according to the Beta distribution.
Let us introduce a single exception, if j corresponds to LSDP and i corresponds to LDDP, then εji can be differ
in value from εi. This gives us the following matrix of εji values (the numeric indices are assigned according to
Table 4):
ε =


0 1.13 2.27 8.87
3.52 0 2.27 22
3.52 1.13 0 8.87
3.52 1.13 2.27 0

 . (21)
Note that the diagonal elements of the matrix ε are set to zero, as it is not possible to switch to the state the
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Figure 9: The the rank-size distributions of the most succesful parties during the 1992 election fitted by the
proposed model. Only the following parties were considered: SK (a), LSDP (b), LKDP (c) and LDDP (d).
The empirical values are shown as black circles, while solid curves represent numerical results obtained from
the proposed model, driven by Eqs. (18) and (19) (the same model run as in Fig. 8). The parameters of the
model are given in Table 4.
agent is already in. As you can see in Figs. 10 and 11, the fit provided by the model has significantly improved
for the LSDP by just by making this small change.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the parties’ vote share PDFs and the rank-size distributions observed during
the Lithuanian parliamentary elections. Namely, we have considered the 1992, 2008 and 2012 parliamentary
elections’ data sets. We have determined that the empirical vote share PDFs and the rank-size distributions are
rather well fitted by assuming that the underlying distribution is the Beta distribution or a mixture of two Beta
distributions. Reviewing literature we have found that [54, 57, 62, 63] have reported somewhat similar results.
In [57, 62] it was reported that the empirical data is rather well fitted by a mixture of Weibull distributions.
In [63] it was noted that multiple different distributions, Weibull, log-normal and normal, provide good fits for
the distribution of religions’ adherents. We argue that the Beta distribution is more suitable as it has correct
support (probabilities are defined for v ∈ [0; 1]; although the other distributions could be arbitrary truncated)
and it arises from a simple easily tractable agent-based model. From our empirical analysis it follows that the
mixture of Beta distributions is needed to fit the data if there is underlying spatial segregation of the electorate.
In [54] it is also reported that the empirical data is rather well fitted by Beta distribution, which arises from a
noisy Voter model. Yet [54] did not observe the vote share segregation pattern.
Having in mind the stark difference between the psychologically motivated models, such as bounded confidence
model [15,16], we would like to point out that the observed statistical patterns as well as the applicability of the
model could arise due to numerous unrelated reasons. One of the alternative possibilities would be the people
mobility patterns. In the proposed model a single agent switching from supporting one party to supporting
another party, could also represent one agent moving away from the modeled geographic location, due to social
or economic reasons, and another agent, holding different political views, moving in. A similar idea was raised
in [53].
In the nearest future we will consider spatial modeling of the Lithuanian parliamentary elections. Another
possible approach, with forecasting possibility, could be considering a temporal regression model for the at-
tractiveness parameters of the proposed model, εi, as well as the estimation of the agent interaction rates,
h.
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Figure 10: The vote share PDFs of the most popular parties during 1992 election fitted by the asymmetric
model. Only the following parties were considered: SK (a), LSDP (b), LKDP (c) and LDDP (d). The empirical
values are shown as black circles, while solid curves represent data numerically generated by the proposed model
with attractiveness dependent on both current agent state and the perceived state. Model parameters are given
by Eq. (21) (the same model run as in Fig. 11).
Figure 11: The rank-size distributions of the most popular parties during 1992 election fitted by the asymmetric
model. Only the following parties were considered: SK (a), LSDP (b), LKDP (c) and LDDP (d). The empirical
values are shown as black circles, while solid curves represent data numerically generated by the proposed model
with attractiveness dependent on both current agent state and the perceived state. Model parameters are given
by Eq. (21) (the same model run as in Fig. 10).
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